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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S FRAUDULENT 
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM 
A. Plaintiff was Compelled to Answer Defendants Second Set of Requests 
for Admissions in Accordance with the Trial Court's Definition of 
"Latent". 
As stated previously in Plaintiffs initial Brief, Plaintiff objected to Defendants 
request for admissions and Defendants brought a motion to compel discovery. The trial 
court ordered Plaintiff to answer which defects in the home were "latent" based upon the 
trial court's definition of "latent" meaning hidden. See Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant pg. 26. Defendants assert that Plaintiff was in no way compelled by the trial 
court to admit which defects were "latent" or "patent". Defendants state "Plaintiff 
answered the requests for admissions in question freely and without compulsion." See 
Reply Brief of Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Appellees Dan Smith and Carol Smith 
pg. 13. (Hereinafter Defendants' Reply Brief). However, Defendants admit that "[t]he 
trial court ultimately required Plaintiff to answer." See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 14. 
Plaintiff was compelled to answer which defects were visibly hidden or "latent" pursuant 
to the trial courts definition. 
However, Defendants argue that if Plaintiff had "reservations about the trial 
court's definition for the terms "patent" and "latent", she could have simply denied that 
any of the alleged defects were "patent"." Id. This is not true as many of the defects 
were "visible" pursuant to the trial courts definition. Plaintiff had no reservations 
regarding the trial courts definition at that time because the fact regarding whether a 
defect was visible or not visible would be a factor for the jury to consider in determining 
if Plaintiff acted reasonably in not discovering the defect. Therefore, Plaintiff answered 
these admissions pursuant to the trial court's definition. The error the trial court 
committed was not in requiring Plaintiff to answer the admissions pursuant to its 
definition of "latent" but in taking those admissions one step further by mistakenly 
applying them to the doctrine of caveat emptor. By taking that step, the trial court, mid-
stream and without any notice to Plaintiff, abandoned its definition of latent for the legal 
definition of reasonably discoverable. Plaintiff, who had merely admitted that many of 
the defects were "visible", was now held to have admitted that they were "discoverable". 
This was reversible error. 
Plaintiff has shown that the legal definition of a "latent" defect is vastly more 
complicated than a simple visible or non-visible analysis. A "latent" defect, for the 
purposes of the doctrine of caveat emptor, is a defect that is not discoverable upon a 
reasonable inspection by an ordinary buyer without any specialized knowledge in the 
field of construction or real estate. See Brief of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 27-28. 
Further, Plaintiff has never claimed that she was "mislead" by the trial court into 
mistaken admissions as the Defendants claimed. Plaintiff merely believes that the trial 
court erred in applying these admissions to the doctrine of caveat emptor and granting 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Defendants further argue that all of the 42 defects would have been discovered in 
1994 if an inspection had been obtained. See Defendants Reply Brief pg. 15. This 
argument is not true and is based on the incorrect assumption that a home inspection is 
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required before the purchase of all homes or the doctrine of caveat emptor will apply. As 
Plaintiff has already shown, Utah law does not mandate a home inspection. Plaintiff had 
no reason to believe that a home inspection would be necessary on a home that was only 
a few weeks old, purchased directly from the licensed general contractor who had built it 
and who informed them that there were no problems they needed to know about because 
it was a "new home". See Brief of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 23-24. 
Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not offered any actual proof that any of 
the 35 defects were "unobservable upon reasonable inspection." See Defendants Reply 
Brief pg. 15. Plaintiff is not required to do this. Plaintiff merely has to show that the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment on the 35 defects based upon an incorrect 
definition of "latent" as it relates to the doctrine of caveat emptor. This error alone 
requires that the trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment be overturned 
leaving it to the jury to determine which defects were "latent" or "patent" pursuant to the 
legal definition. 
B. Defects No. 12 and No. 38 are not "Clear" Cases Appropriate for 
Summary Judgment. 
Whether or not a defect is discoverable upon a reasonable inspection is a question 
of reasonableness that should be reserved for jury resolution except in the clearest cases. 
Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286,118, 12 P.3d 1011. Defendants claim that 
this is a "clear case" in which summary judgment was appropriate. See Defendants' 
Reply Brief pg. 16. Plaintiff respectfully disagrees. 
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Defect #12 was a defect in the smoke detectors. The UBC requires that all smoke 
detectors be hard wired and not merely battery operated. This allows all smoke detectors 
to go off simultaneously if one smoke detector in any part of the house goes off making it 
more likely that all people in the home will escape in case of a fire. (R. 591). A 
reasonable inspection on the part of the Plaintiff would not have revealed that the smoke 
detectors were not hard wired. Further, even if Plaintiff could have observed that the 
smoke detectors were not hardwired how would she know that this was a defect in the 
construction of the home? Plaintiff was not aware of the requirement of the UBC. 
Defect #38 was a lack of ventilation in the roof. (R. 622). Only a person with 
expert knowledge in construction would be aware of what amount of ventilation is 
necessary in an attic. Even if you could see the ventilation, Plaintiff would have no way 
of knowing if it was lacking. These two defects certainly do not qualify as a "clear case" 
and should have been reserved for a jury to decide. 
Although these two defects may seem trivial in the cost of the repairs, many of the 
other defects in the home that were dismissed will require substantial cost in making the 
repairs. Defects #12 and #38 should not have been dismissed in summary judgment. 
C. The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor Should Not Apply to the Sale of This 
Home. 
Defendants do not cite any authority contrary to Plaintiffs position that an 
admission for a prior motion for summary judgment is not necessarily an admission for a 
subsequent motion for summary judgment. Further, Plaintiff did not admit that the home 
was "used". See Brief of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 32-33. 
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The doctrine of caveat emptor should not apply to the sale of this home under 
these circumstances. Defendants assert that if a home is lived in at all, even for only a 
few short weeks by the builder, it should be defined as "used". Defendants contend that 
it would be more problematic for trial courts to not have a clear-cut definition when 
determining if a home is "new" or "used" for purposes of the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 18. However, no bright line standard is necessary. A 
fact intensive review of each case could be conducted to determine if the doctrine of 
caveat emptor should apply with a determination of "new" or "used" not being necessary. 
In this case, the doctrine of caveat emptor should not apply since the home was 
virtually new, Plaintiff purchased the home directly from the builder and there was 
nothing that put Plaintiff on notice that there might be problems in the home. Defendants 
claim that the "as is" language should have put Plaintiff on notice. However, when 
Plaintiff inquired of potential problems in the home when discussing the "as is" clause, 
the Defendants reassured the Plaintiff that the home was new indicating that there were 
no problems. (R. 2424 Jury Trial Transcript pg. 0103). 
Further, the doctrine of caveat emptor should not apply when a person purchases a 
home directly from a licensed general contractor who built the home. A person should be 
able to assume that a licensed general contractor is competent, experienced and 
knowledgeable of the code requirements and that the house will be built without 
significant defects. A comparison could be made between general contractors and real 
estate agents. The Supreme Court of Utah stated, 
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In this state, it is apparent that the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to those 
dealing with a licensed real estate agent. Though not occupying a fiduciary 
relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the vendor is 
expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is answerable at law for 
breaches of his or her statutory duty to the public. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980) (superseded by statute on other 
grounds). Even when a real estate agent represents the seller and not the buyer in the sale 
of a home, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to the sale of that home in 
relation to the real estate agent. The same rule should apply to a licensed general 
contractor in this State who is selling a home he or she built. The doctrine of caveat 
emptor should not apply to the sale of this home because Defendant Dan Smith was a 
licensed general contractor who built the home in question and promptly sold it directly 
to Plaintiff. 
D. Smith v. Frandsen is Applicable to this Case. 
Plaintiff readily admits that the builder/contractor in Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 
55, 94P.3d919 was not a party to the lawsuit. However that does not make Smith v. 
Frandsen inapplicable to this case. Defendants argue that (1) the language in Smith v. 
Frandsen which supports the "proposition that the doctrine of caveat emptor has been 
abandoned in Utah" is language "culled from other jurisdictions" and thus has no 
application in Utah and (2) because the trial court ruled on the motion for summary 
judgment in August of 2003 and the Smith v. Frandsen decision was not rendered until 
July of 2004, it is not applicable. See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 22. Defendants fail to 
grasp how case law in many respects is made and how it is applied to lower court rulings. 
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First, it is beyond dispute that both state and federal appellant courts often look to 
the reasoning and decisions of appellant courts of sister jurisdictions when faced with a 
legal issue of first impression. The reasoning of those sister jurisdictions are often cited 
with approval and adopted. Second, it is the current state of the law which will govern in 
most cases irrespective of when a lower court entered its ruling. It is nonsensical to 
assert that Frandsen does not apply merely because it was decided after these events 
occurred. 
This case is still being adjudicated and is being appealed at this time; therefore 
current Utah law will govern. Pursuant to Smith v. Frandsen, it appears that the doctrine 
of caveat emptor has been abandoned in Utah. Once more, if this Court determines that 
the doctrine of caveat emptor is not abandoned in the sale of "used" residential housing, 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to certify this appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 43 so that the Utah Supreme Court can decide if this doctrine should be abandoned 
in the sale of "used" residential construction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF 
CONTRACT CLAIM 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs entire Breach of Contract claim should be barred 
by the doctrine of caveat emptor. See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 23. Defendants have 
failed to cite any authority in support of this assertion because no authority exists. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated that under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor "in the 
absence of express agreement or misrepresentation, the purchaser is expected to make his 
own examination and draw his own conclusions as to the condition of the land; and the 
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vendor is, in general, not liable for any harm resulting to him or others from any defect 
existing at the time of transfer." Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 
1987). The doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to issues where there is an express 
agreement (contract) or a misrepresentation. A breach of contract is not affected by the 
doctrine of caveat emptor because the terms of the contract apply and if those terms were 
breached then the defaulting party would be liable. 
Defendants further claim "there was not evidence that the HVAC (heating, air-
conditioning, ventilating system) was inoperable at the time of closing." Pursuant to 
Paragraph C(c) of the EMS A the ventilating systems were warranted to be in sound and 
satisfactory working condition at closing, not merely operable. See Brief of the 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 35-36. There is evidence that the ventilating system was 
not in sound satisfactory working condition at the time of closing. Defect #6 and #38 
showed that there was significant lack of attic ventilation that would cost over $12,000 to 
repair. (R. 584, 622). The amount of attic ventilation at the time the expert report was 
done was the same amount of attic ventilation at the time of closing; Plaintiff never 
decreased the amount of attic ventilation. Just because this defect laid dormant until 
enough damage had been caused by the lack of ventilation before the defect could come 
to light, does not mean that it did not exist at the time of closing. The entire roof of the 
home had substantial damage at the time of the expert report that would require the entire 
roof to be replaced. (R. 584). 
The interpretation to the term "notice" as used in Paragraph C of the EMSA is 
critical to any evaluation of Plaintiff s breach of contract claim. In Plaintiffs initial brief 
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she defined the term "notice" pursuant to Utah case law and Black's Law Dictionary. 
Clearly, under the legal definition of "notice" it is not required that the "notice" must be 
received from a third party as Defendants argue. Defendants stated, "it is clear that 
Plaintiffs multi-definitional version of the word "notice" is not what was intended. 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to redefine the plain meaning of the term as it is used in 
the EMSA." See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 25. Plaintiff is not redefining the 
definition of "notice" as used in the EMSA. The EMSA does not define "notice", for that 
reason Plaintiff went to the logical place in search of a definition, Utah case law and 
Black's Law Dictionary. Defendants' assertion that "notice" must be "received" by a 
third party or no notice can exist is illogical. Under their definition, Defendants could 
have had specific actual knowledge of each defect and the standards of the UBC and they 
would still not have had "notice" pursuant to Paragraph C. Defendants' definition of 
notice does not comport with the common usage of the term or with the legal definition 
of "notice". The focus should be on the word "notice" and not on the word "receive". If 
the Defendants had knowledge of the code violations they should be deemed to have had 
"notice" of the code violations irrespective of an analysis of how that knowledge was 
"received". 
Defendants further allege "it is undisputed that Defendants did not 'receive' any 
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation". See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 25. 
This is wholly inaccurate. As demonstrated in Plaintiffs initial brief, Defendants 
received notice of the attic ventilation defect and the defect in the stairs by a third party, 
the building inspector. (R. Transcript Motions Hearing April 1, 2004 pg. 0023-0025). 
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Therefore, even if Defendants interpretation of the contract was correct, the trial court 
should not have dismissed these defects. 
Lastly, Plaintiff had no duty to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
ruling as Defendants have claimed. Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation was 
dismissed in a motion for summary judgment and thus is reviewed for correctness, 
granting no deference to the district court. Swan Creek Vill Homeowners Ass *n v. 
Warne, 2006 UT 22, f 16, 134 P.3d 1122. When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Culp Constr. 
Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1990). Consequently, Plaintiff had no 
duty to marshal any evidence regarding the breach of contract claim. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM 
SHOULD BE REINSTATED 
Defendants "agree with Plaintiffs analysis of the doctrine of merger". See 
Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 27. However, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs negligent 
misrepresentation claim should be barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of 
caveat emptor. The statute of limitations argument has been addressed previously. The 
doctrine of caveat emptor would not apply to Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation 
claim. As argued above, the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply where there is an 
actual misrepresentation. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 766 (Utah 1987). 
Therefore, Plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation claim should be reinstated. 
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IV. DEFENDANTS HAVE MISSTATED THE MAJORITY RULE 
REGARDING AN EXPERTS TIME SPENT IN PREPARING FOR 
DEPOSITIONS 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state "the court shall require that the party 
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4(C)(i). Defendants claim "this statute is not 
ambiguous. It states that where one party deposes the opposing party's expert, the 
deposing party is responsible to pay the expert ca reasonable fee5 for time spent at the 
deposition." See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 27. Emphasis added. The mere fact that 
in this issue of first impression Defendants feel compelled to read into the Rule what they 
feel it should state, is ample evidence that it needs interpreting by the Court. 
First, Defendants have misstated what the majority rule is in interpreting Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i). Defendants wrongfully state that the 
majority rule holds that an expert's reasonable time in preparation for deposition is not 
compensable. Defendants cite no authority supporting their claim. Defendants merely 
cite to cases that have adopted the minority rule. Plaintiff admits that she has not 
researched the rule in every single state or jurisdiction and then tallied up how many hold 
preparation time is compensable and how many hold it is not. However, Magee v. Paul 
Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) states that the majority of 
courts who have reviewed this issue hold that an experts preparation time is compensable. 
In her initial brief Plaintiff cited to seven (7) other jurisdictions that agreed with the 
holding in Magee. See Brief of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 45 footnote 5. Plaintiff 
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recognizes that this dispute regarding which is the majority rule and which is the minority 
rule is not entirely relevant because this Court can adopt either of these rules. 
Secondly, Defendants argue that if the majority rule is adopted as proposed by the 
Plaintiff, it would provide an "incentive for plaintiffs to educate themselves and prepare 
for trial at the expense of the party deposing their expert... the defendant will in effect 
pay a substantial amount of the plaintiffs trial preparation costs and plaintiffs' counsel's 
education." See Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 28. Defendants'fears are unfounded. The 
majority rule does not allow a party to be compensated "for the time the expert spent 
preparing the attorney who retained him" neither would the party be compensated for 
time the attorney spent preparing the expert for questions. Magee at 647. The purpose of 
the majority rule is to allow the expert a reasonable amount of time to review his 
findings, notes, reports, etc. thus eliminating the need the expert has to turn repeatedly to 
relevant records in order to refresh his memory during depositions. Hose v. Chicago & 
N. W. Tramp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Iowa 1994). Thus, the time an expert 
spends in preparing ultimately saves deposition time, time that is unquestionably paid for 
by the deposing party. In Collins v. Vill OfWoodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 357-358 (N.D. 
111. 1999) the court held that "it is entirely fair, and authorized by Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i) ... 
to require a party who seeks to depose an expert from whom he has received a written 
report... to pay the reasonable fees associated with the expert's time reasonably spent 
preparing for the deposition." 
Defendants cite to Rhee v. Witco, 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. 111. 1989) to support 
their argument that a case between one plaintiff and one defendant is not a complex case. 
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Rhee does state that particular case was not complex and one of the factors it listed was 
that there was only one plaintiff and one defendant. However, there is no other 
discussion as to the facts and complexity of the case. Surely a case would not 
automatically be considered complex because there were more than two parties to the suit 
and surely it would not automatically be considered simple because there were only two 
parties to the litigation. If this were the case, then a case like Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, 
Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Texas App. 1987) would not be considered complex even though 
the case was extremely complicated and $11,100,000,000.00 in damages ultimately 
awarded. The number of parties to a suit should not influence the need the expert would 
have in reviewing his/her documents. 
Lastly, Defendants claim that the time that elapsed between the time the experts 
did their reports and the time depositions were taken were caused by the Plaintiff. See 
Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 29. Defendants have not cited to the record to support this 
allegation. Plaintiff had four expert witnesses who did reports and were deposed by the 
Defendants. Rex Radford and Lloyd Steenblik finished their expert reports on December 
14, 2001 and were deposed on February 18 and March 17, 2003. (R. 563). Jason 
Bullock finished his report on August 7, 2000 and was deposed on February 20, 2003. 
(R. 538). Mark O'Barr finished his expert on October 9, 2000 and was deposed on 
February 19, 2003. (R. 655). Defendants' Motion to Compel was not the reason for the 
delay in the depositions and even without the Motion to Compel Plaintiffs experts would 
have had to review their reports to refresh their memories. Therefore, this court should 
award Plaintiff her costs in having her experts prepare for the depositions. 
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V. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
A. Plaintiff is Entitled to all of Her Attorneys' Fees and Costs Because of 
the Express Language in the EMSA. 
Paragraph "N" of the EMSA states in the pertinent part: 
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing suit or otherwise. 
(See Appellants' Addendum No. 7) (Emphasis added). Defendants do not dispute that 
they defaulted on the EMSA or that the language of the EMSA "does not require there to 
be a successful or prevailing party in order for attorney's fees to be awarded." See 
Defendants' Reply Brief pg. 35. If the successful party standard is inapplicable to this 
case so is the requirement that Plaintiff should have separated her claims between 
successful and unsuccessful claims. 
It is true that a party seeking an award of attorneys' fees under a contract must 
establish that the contract's terms anticipated such an award. Maynard v. Wharton, 912 
P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996). The EMSA specifically states that attorney's fees and costs 
should be awarded for "enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing suit or otherwise." Emphasis added. This language anticipates that the defaulting 
Party should pay all fees and costs. The contract did not anticipate that only fees in 
pursuing a breach of contract claim could be recoverable. If that was the meaning of the 
language in the EMSA then why would it state "in pursuing any remedy" provided under 
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applicable law "whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise"? The EMSA 
could have simply stated that attorneys' fees are only recoverable in pursuing a breach of 
contract claim. That is not what the plain language of the EMSA says. The plain 
language of the EMSA supports Plaintiffs contention that all fees and costs incurred by 
Mrs. Moore in pursing any remedy are recoverable. Any other interpretation of the 
EMSA would make the remaining language superfluous. Therefore, the trial court erred 
in limiting Mrs. Moored attorneys fees to solely her breach of contract cause of action. 
Defendants rely on Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998) and Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982) for their 
argument that Plaintiff is only entitled to fees on her breach of contract cause of action. 
In Foote the language in the EMSA that allowed for attorneys fees is virtually identical to 
the language of the EMSA in the present case. In Turtle the contract also provided that 
the defaulting party should bear the costs of attorneys fees. Turtle at 671. Although both 
of these cases had a defaulting party attorney's fees clause, they are both completely 
distinguishable from the present case. In Foote the plaintiff suffered no actual harm and 
was just awarded minimal damages. Further, the plaintiff was seeking attorney's fees 
against the Clarks on causes of action that were solely brought against another defendant, 
the real estate agent Hatch. Plaintiffs in Foote had no statutory or contractual right to 
seek fees against Hatch and therefore they argued that the Clarks should have to pay all 
of their fees, even those fees expended against Hatch. The Utah Supreme Court noted 
that "When a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he should not have a 
free ride to assert claims against other defendants with the expectation that the target 
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defendant will end up paying all attorney's fees." Foote at 56 quoting Turtle at 671. In 
Turtle the Plaintiff was also seeking attorneys fees against parties not found to be in 
default. In both of these cases the court held that attorneys' fees against the defaulting 
party were permissible but attorneys' fees against another defendant who was not in 
default are not. In this case there is only one defaulting party, the Smiths. Plaintiff is not 
seeking attorneys fees against any other defendant such as in Foote and Turtle and 
therefore Plaintiff should be allowed to recover all of her reasonable attorneys' fees 
against the defaulting party, the Smiths. 
B. Plaintiff is Entitled to all her Attorneys' Fees and Costs Because the 
Claims are so Closely Related and Intertwined as to be 
Indistinguishable. 
Even if this Court should hold that Plaintiff should have separated out her fees and 
costs pursuant to which claims she was successful on, Plaintiff should still recover all 
fees and costs requested. It is well established law that when a "plaintiff brings multiple 
claims involving a common core of facts and related legal theories, and prevails on at 
least some of its claims, it is entitled to compensation for all attorneys fees reasonably 
incurred in the litigation." Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, f20, 
993 P.2d 222; see also Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App 335, f 12, 991 P.2d 1113 and 
Winters v. Schulman, 2001 WL 357124 (Utah App. 2001). There is no doubt that all of 
Plaintiffs causes of action arose from a common core of facts and related legal theories. 
In fact, every cause of action stemmed from the exact same core of facts, namely, that the 
Defendants built the house with many defects in it; that Defendants knew or should have 
known of these defects; and that they did not inform Mrs. Moore of the defects in the 
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home or repair the defects as they warranted in the EMS A. Plaintiff would not have 
litigated this case any differently even if she had brought a single breach of contact cause 
of action. 
Defendants cite to Winters v. Schulman, 2001 WL 357124 (Utah App. 2001) to 
support their argument that the trial court did not err in allowing Plaintiff to only recover 
fees and costs on her breach of contract claim. In Winters, the court does recognize that 
all fees and costs are recoverable if they involve a common core of facts and legal 
theories. However, in Winters the trial court did not award the plaintiff all of their fees 
and costs. The trial court made a specific finding that the causes of action and facts are 
not "so intertwined that they could not be categorized according to the theory at issue." 
Further, the trial court provided a method for the attorneys to use to separate the different 
claims. In Mrs. Moore's case the trial court did not make a specific finding that the 
causes of actions and facts were not so intertwined as to be indistinguishable. Indeed, the 
trial court held that the opposite stating it was "difficult to differentiate between what 
legal services were necessary for the prosecution of the subject of breach of contract 
claim and the Plaintiffs other causes of action." (R. 2403). Plaintiff did a sincere effort 
to follow the trial courts directive and separated the fees under successful and 
unsuccessful claims. See Addendum #4 in Defendants' Reply Brief. Plaintiff removed 
every single fee that could be determined to not associate with Plaintiffs pursuit of her 
breach of contract cause of action. (R. 2308). As to the expenses and costs, it is 
impossible to determine if any of these items did not relate to the breach of contract 
claim. It is most probable that all the fees and costs relate to the breach of contract claim 
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since all the causes of action stem from the same core facts. Therefore, even under a 
successful party analysis Plaintiff should be awarded all the fees and costs she requested. 
C. The Trial Court Inappropriately Reduced Plaintiffs Requested Fees 
and Costs Without Supporting Findings of Fact. 
If the trial court awards less than the amount of fees requested, when there is 
adequate evidence to support that amount, the trial court must "offer an explanation for 
the reduction." Plaintiff provided all necessary evidence to support her request for 
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 73(b). (R. 2148). Defendants failed 
to present any evidence in opposition to Plaintiffs reasonableness of their fees and costs. 
The trial court found that a few of the items billed by Plaintiff were not reasonable and 
the majority of those items were removed by Plaintiff in their request for fees. See Brief 
of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant pg. 55-57. 
Further, Plaintiffs attorneys' fees were increased many times by the litigation 
tactics employed by the Defendants. Defendants should not be able to claim that 
Plaintiffs attorneys' fees are unreasonably high when their own tactics were the cause of 
it. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). Further, the trial court states 
that the "$ 120,000 plus requested attorney's fee is more than four times the monetary 
award given the Plaintiff by the jury and is substantially more than the $83,000.00 total 
purchase price for the subject home." (R. 2403). This is not a justification in a reduction 
of the award of fees. The Foote case specifically stated that "the amount of plaintiffs' 
recovery in this case is irrelevant under the language of the contract." Foote at 54. The 
purchase price of the home did not consider that the home was purchased twelve (12) 
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years ago and that the value of the home has substantially appreciated. Neither the trial 
court nor the Defendants have presented any evidence or findings to support a reduction 
in attorney's fees from $123,639.64 to $40,000.00 and costs and expenses from 
$35,288.08 to $10,000.00. No adequate explanation for this reduction was given by the 
trial court because no basis for such a reduction exists and Plaintiff should be awarded all 
attorneys' fees and costs she requested because they were reasonably incurred. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny Defendants' claims on appeal. 
Indeed, Defendants have not responded to the fact of their (1) failure to preserve 
numerous issues below, (2) invited errors now complained of, and (3) failure to marshal 
the evidence in support of their positions. For these reasons alone, their appeal should 
fail. 
Additionally this Court should reverse the trial court's Orders (1) dismissing 
Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation claim entered on August 16, 2001 (R. 152); (2) 
denying Plaintiffs request for expert fees entered on August 20, 2003 (R. 1263); (3) 
dismissing 37 of the 42 original defects relating to Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure 
claim entered on October 1, 2003 (R. 1293); (4) Dismissing 41 of the 42 original defects 
relating to Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claim entered on June 23, 2004 (R. 1749); and 
(5) partially granting Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs entered on August 25, 2005. (R. 
2411). 
Further, Mrs. Moore requests this Court to Order a reinstatement of (1) her 
negligent misrepresentation cause of action; (2) her 37 and 41 defects respectively under 
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her fraudulent nondisclosure and breach of contract claims; (3) her expert fees incurred in 
preparing for Defendants' discovery and (4) all of her reasonable attorney fees, costs and 
expenses incurred before the trial court including those for defending and prosecuting this 
appeal. 
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